1 Abstract 1 Priors and payoffs are known to change perceptual decision-making, but little is understood 2 about how they influence confidence judgments. Human observers performed an orientation-3 discrimination task with varied priors and payoffs. We investigated the subsequent placement 4 of discrimination and confidence criteria by comparing behavior to several plausible Signal 5 Detection Theory models. A normative account of behavior uses optimal discrimination 6 criteria. Optimal confidence criteria are yoked to the accuracy-maximizing criterion (i.e., are 7 not affected by payoffs). Additionally, in a normative account, the criterion shifts predicted 8
Introduction
In making a perceptual decision, it is wise to consider information beyond the available 18 sensory evidence. To maximize expected gains, one should consider both the baseline prob-19 ability of each possible world state, i.e. priors, as well as the associated risks and rewards 20 for choosing or not choosing each response alternative, i.e., payoffs. In the Signal Detection 21 Theory (SDT) framework, priors and payoffs alter the threshold amount of evidence required 22 to choose one alternative versus another, that is, a shift in the criterion for reporting option 23 "A" versus option "B" in a binary task. For example, a radiologist may be trying to detect 24 a tumor from an x-ray. The radiologist should be more likely to report a positive result 25 for a suspicious shadow if the patient's file indicates they are a smoker, as this means they 26 have a higher prior probability of cancer. Similarly, the high cost of waiting to treat the 27 cancer should also bias the radiologist towards declaring a positive result. In both real and 28 laboratory environments, observers have been found to factor in priors and payoffs when set-29 ting the decision criterion (Maddox and Bohil, 1998, 2000 shortly. 32 Decisions about the state of the world (cancer or not cancer, cat or dog, clockwise or 33 counter-clockwise of vertical) are based on the stimulus alone and are classified as stimulus-34 conditioned responses or Type 1 decisions in the literature. These differ from Type 2 decisions 35 (or response-conditioned responses), which are judgments about the correctness of Type 1 36 decisions (Clarke et al., 1959; Mamassian, 2016) . In layman's terms, Type 2 responses are 37 the observer's confidence about a decision they've made, which are often operationalized in 38 binary decision-making experiments as a subjective estimate of the probability the Type 1 39 response was correct (Pouget et al., 2016) . Confidence plays a broad role in guiding behavior, 40 subsequent decision-making, and learning in a multitude of scenarios for both humans and 41 animals (Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1996; Smith et al., 2003; Beran et al., 2012) . 42 How does an ideal-observer radiologist modify confidence judgments in response to vary-43 ing priors or payoffs? Intuitively, a radiologist should be more confident in a positive diag-44 nosis when the patient is a smoker, given the prior scientific literature on the health risks 45 of smoking that the radiologist has read. Additional confirmatory information should boost 46 confidence in that positive diagnosis, and contrary evidence should reduce confidence, be-47 cause priors (smoker or non-smoker) and sensory evidence (cancerous-looking shadow) are 48 both informative about the likelihood over possible world states. However, this is not the 49 case for payoffs. Incentivizing the different responses with rewards or costs does not change 50 the uncertainty about the world state. The radiologist should not be more or less sure of a 51 cancer diagnosis if the type of cancer would be deadly or benign, even though this should 52 affect their initial diagnosis. In fact, sometimes payoffs will lead the decision-maker to choose 53 the less probable alternative and this should be reflected by low confidence in the decision. 54 Little is known about how human observers adjust confidence in response to prior-payoff 55 structures. In one perceptual study, the prior probabilities of target present versus absent 56 affected the placement of the criteria for Type 1 and 2 judgments (Sherman et al., 2015) , 57 with some evidence that confidence better predicts performance for responses congruent with 58 the more probable outcome than those that are incongruent. In the realm of social judg-59 ments, prior probabilities have been shown to modulate the degree of confidence, with higher 60 confidence assigned to more probable outcomes (Manis et al., 1980) . However, others have 61 found counter-productive incorporation of priors, with over-confidence for low-probability 62 outcomes and under-confidence for high-probability outcomes (Dunning et al., 1990) . In 63 regards to payoffs, early work on monetary incentives in perceptual categorization did col-64 lect confidence ratings, however they were not included in any analyses (Lee and Zentall, 65 1966). Consideration of payoff structures is ubiquitous in animal studies of confidence that 66 employ post-decisional wagering methods (Smith et al., 2003) . For example, in the opt-out 67 paradigm, to distinguish between low and high confidence, the animal chooses between a 68 small, certain reward and a risky alternative with either high reward or no reward, for cor-69 rect and incorrect perceptual responses respectively ). However, 70 because animals are motivated by their expected gain and not explicit verbal instructions, 71 it is impossible to isolate decision confidence unconfounded with the subjective value of the 72 reward. 73 Here, we seek to characterize how human observers adjust perceptual decisions and confi-74 dence in response to joint manipulation of priors and payoffs. First, we defined a normative 75 model of confidence judgments that factors in the prior-payoff structure of the environ-76 ment. Then, we measured how well this model explains human behavior in an orientation-77 discrimination task, as compared to several sub-optimal decision models. We found that 78 all observers made sub-optimal confidence judgments, but fell into two distinct groups de-79 pending on their strategy. These results highlight the importance of considering the effect of 80 priors and payoffs on confidence, particularly in applied or real-world scenarios where they 81 are likely to be non-uniform across the decision alternatives. In this section we describe the rationale and background for the modeling of Type 1 and 84 Type 2 decision-making. We follow the example of a left-right orientation judgment followed 85 by a binary low-high confidence judgment to match the experimental paradigm used in the 86 present study. First the range of Type 1 models are identified, which assess the placement 87 of the discrimination decision criterion under different prior-payoffs scenarios. Then the 88 Type 2 models are outlined, describing the different potential relationships between the 89 decision criteria for confidence and the criterion for discrimination. 
The Type 1 Decision

91
To make the Type 1 decision, observers must relate a noisy internal measurement, x, of the 92 stimulus, s, where s ∈ {s L , s R }, to a binary response, which in the context of our experiment 93 is "tilted left" (say "s = s L ") or "tilted right" (say "s = s R "). This is done by a comparison 94 to an internal criterion, k 1 , such that if x < k 1 , the observer will respond with"tilted left", 95 and otherwise "titled right" (Figure 1a ). The only component of the Type 1 model where 96 the observer has any control is deciding where to place the criterion. The optimal value of k 1 97 (k opt ) maximizes the expected gain, ensuring the observer makes the most points/money/etc. 98 over the course of the experiment. The value of k opt depends on three things:
99
(i) The sensitivity of the observer, d . In the standard model of the decision space, 100
Under this transformation, the sensitivity d corresponds to the distance between the 102 peaks of the two internal measurement distributions.
103
(ii) The prior probability of each stimulus alternative, P (s L ) and P (s R ) = 1 − P (s L ).
104
(iii) The rewards for the four possible stimulus-response pairs, V r,s , which are the rewards 105 (positive) or costs (negative) of responding r when the stimulus is s. 106 An ideal observer that maximizes expected gain (Green and Swets, 1966) uses criterion
where the likelihood ratio β opt at the optimal criterion is a function of priors and payoffs:
In our experiment, 0 points are awarded for incorrect answers, allowing us to simplify:
Thus, k opt = k p +k v , where k p is the optimal criterion location if only priors were asymmetric 110 and k v is the optimal criterion if only the payoffs were varied. As can be seen in Eq. 3, 111 the effects of priors and payoffs sum when determining the optimal criterion (illustrated in 112 Figure 1b ). When the priors are more similar, or the payoffs are closer to equal, k opt is closer 113 to the neutral criterion k neu = 0. Note that in the case of symmetric payoffs, k opt maximizes 114 both expected gain and expected accuracy, whereas when asymmetric payoffs are involved, 115 k opt maximizes expected gain only (i.e., k opt = k p ). This is because to maximize expected 116 gain, from time to time the observer is incentivized to choose the less probable outcome 117 because it is more rewarded. Often, human observers use a sub-optimal value of k 1 when the prior probabilities or payoffs 120 are not identical for each alternative. A common observation is that the criterion is not 121 adjusted far enough from the neutral criterion towards the optimal criterion, k neu < k 1 < k opt 122 or k neu > k 1 > k opt , a behavior referred to as conservatism (Green and Swets, 1966; Maddox, 123 2002). It is useful to express conservatism as a weighted sum of the neutral and optimal 124 criterion:
with 0 < α < 1 indicating conservative criterion placement. The degree of conservatism is 126 greater the closer α is to 0 (Figure 1c ). Several studies have contrasted the conservatism for 127 unequal priors versus unequal payoffs, typically finding greater conservatism for unequal pay-128 offs (Lee and Zentall, 1966; Ulehla, 1966; Healy and Kubovy, 1981; Ackermann and Landy, 129 2015) with few exceptions (Healy and Kubovy, 1978) . This may result from an underlying 130 criterion-adjustment strategy that depends on the shape of the expected gain curve (as a 131 function of criterion placement) and not just on the position of the optimal criterion max-132
imizing expected gain (Busemeyer and Myung, 1992; Ackermann and Landy, 2015) or a 133 strategy that trades off between maximizing expected gain and maximizing expected accu-134 racy (Maddox, 2002; Maddox and Bohil, 2003) . Given that the effects of priors and payoffs 135 sum in Eq. 3, we will consider a sub-optimal model of criterion placement that has separate 136 conservatism factors for payoffs and priors:
The conservatism factors, α p and α v , scale these individually before they are summed to 138
give the final conservative criterion placement, taking into account both prior and payoff 139 asymmetries. This formulation allows for differing degrees of conservatism for priors and 140 payoffs. We consider four models of the Type 1 discrimination decision in this paper, including the 143 optimal model (i) and three sub-optimal models that include varying forms of conservatism 144
(ii-iv):
k 1 = α pv k opt if k p = 0 and k v = 0 (i.e., both asymmetric)
if k p = 0 (i.e., priors symmetric).
149
Thus, we consider models with no conservatism (Ω 1,opt ), with an identical degree of conser-150 vatism due to asymmetric priors and payoffs (Ω 1,1α ), or different amounts of conservatism 151 for prior versus payoff manipulations (Ω 1,2α ). In the fourth model, we drop the assumption 152
(that was based on the optimal model) that effects of payoffs and priors on criterion sum, 153
i.e., that behavior with asymmetric priors and payoffs can be predicted from behavior with 154 each effect alone (Ω 1,3α ). We consider this final model because the additivity of criterion 155 shifts (Eq. 3) has not yet been experimentally confirmed with human observers (Stevenson 156 et al., 1990) .
157
In all models, we also consider an additive bias term, γ, corresponding to a perceptual 158 bias in perceived vertical. The bias is also included in the neutral criterion k neu = γ. For 159 clarity, however, we have omitted it from the mathematical descriptions of the models. Note 160 that any observer best fit by Ω 1,opt but with a γ significantly different from 0 would no longer 161 be considered as having optimal behavior. 162
Confidence Criteria
163
Confidence judgments should reflect the belief that the selected alternative in the discrimi-164 nation decision correctly matches the true world state. Generally speaking, the further the 165 internal measurement is from a well-placed decision boundary, the more evidence there is for 166 the discrimination judgment. This is instantiated in the extended SDT framework by the 167 addition of two or more confidence criteria, k 2 (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012, 2014). There are 168 two such criteria for a binary confidence task and more confidence criteria when more than 169 a)
Internal Measurement
Probability P (x|s L ) P (x|s R ) say "left" say "right" Figure 1 : Illustration of the full SDT model. a) On each trial, an internal measurement of stimulus orientation is drawn from a Gaussian probability distribution conditional on the true stimulus value. The Type 1 criterion, k 1 , defines a cut-off for reporting "left" or "right". The ideal observer in a symmetrical priors and payoffs scenario is shown. b) The ideal observer's criterion placement with both prior and payoff asymmetry. This prior asymmetry encourages a rightward criterion shift to k p and the payoff asymmetry a leftward shift to k v . The optimal criterion placement that maximizes expected gain, k opt , is a sum of these two criterion shifts. For comparison, the neutral criterion, k neu is shown. As the prior asymmetry is greater than the payoff asymmetry, 3:1 vs 1:2, k opt = k neu . c) A sub-optimal conservative observer will not adjust their Type 1 criterion far enough from k neu to be optimal. The parameter α describes the degree of conservatism, with values closer to 0 being more conservative and closer to 1 less conservative. d) In the case of symmetric payoffs and priors, the Type 2 confidence criteria, k 2 , are placed equidistant from the Type 1 decision boundary, carving up the internal measurement space into a low-and high-confidence region for each discrimination response option. e) For the normative Type 2 model, the confidence criteria are placed symmetrically around a hypothetical Type 1 criterion that only maximizes accuracy (k * 1 = k p ). This figure shows the division of the measurement space as per the prior-payoff scenario in (b). As a lefttilted stimulus is much more likely, this results in many high-confidence left-tilt judgments and few high-confidence right-tilt judgments. Note that left versus right judgments still depend on k 1 . f) The same as in (e) but with small δ value. Note the low-confidence region where confidence should be high (left of the left-hand k 2 ). This happens because in this region the observer will choose the Type 1 response that conflicts with the accuracymaximizing criterion, hence they will report low confidence in their decision. Note that the displacements of the criteria from the neutral criterion in this figure are exaggerated for illustrative purposes. two confidence levels are provided. We restrict our treatment to the binary case, which can 170 be trivially extended to include more gradations of confidence.
As illustrated in Figure 1d for the case of symmetric payoffs and priors, there is a k 2 172 confidence criterion on each side of the k 1 decision boundary. If the measurement obtained 173 is beyond one of these criteria relative to k 1 , then the observer will report high confidence, 174 and otherwise will report low confidence. Stated another way, the addition of the confi-175 dence criteria effectively divides the measurement axis into four regions: high-confidence 176 left, low-confidence left, low-confidence right, and high-confidence right. The closer to the 177 discrimination decision boundary that the observer places k 2 , the more high-confidence re-178 sponses they will give. We denote this distance as δ. δ is not always assumed to be identical 179 for both confidence criteria (e.g. Maniscalco and Lau, 2012), but we assumed a single value 180 of δ for model simplicity. Type 2 judgments were not incentivized in our experiment. Thus, 181
there is no explicit cost function to constrain the distance parameter δ, so the precise set-182 ting of δ will not factor into the evaluation of how well the normative model fits observer 183 behavior. The above description of how confidence responses are generated is well suited to cases where 186 the payoffs are symmetric. This is because the optimal decision criterion maximizes both 187 gain and accuracy. For an internal measurement at the discrimination boundary, it is equally 188 probable that the stimulus had a rightward versus leftward orientation. Expressed another 189 way, the log-posterior ratio at k opt is 1. Thus, the distance from the discrimination boundary 190 is a good measure for the probability that the Type 1 response is correct (i.e., confidence 191 as we defined it above). This, however, is not the case when payoffs are asymmetric (k 1 = 192
, as the ideal observer maximizes gain but not accuracy. The 193 log-posterior ratio is not 1 at k opt but rather it is equal to 1 at k p .
194
To extend the SDT model of confidence to asymmetric payoffs, we introduce a new 195 criterion. The counterfactual criterion, k * 1 , is the criterion the ideal observer would have used 196 if they ignored the payoff structure of the environment and exclusively maximized accuracy 197
and not gain (i.e., k * 1 = k p ). It is around this criterion that the observer symmetrically places 198 confidence criteria in our normative model ( Figure 1e ). Whenever payoffs are symmetrical, 199 k 1 = k * 1 . Figure 1f illustrates a situation unique to this model that may occur when payoffs 200 are asymmetrical. Here, the value of δ is sufficiently small that both k 2 criteria fall on the 201 same side of k 1 . As a result, the region between k 1 and the left-hand k 2 criterion results in a 202 low-confidence response despite being beyond the k 2 boundary (relative to k * 1 ). This occurs 203 because this region is to the right of k 1 and thus, due to asymmetric payoffs, the observer will 204 make the less probable choice, thus resulting in low confidence in that choice. Effectively, 205
the left-hand confidence criterion is shifted from k 2 to k 1 . Here, we rely on the assumption 206 that the confidence system is aware of the Type 1 decision (for further discussion of this 207 issue, see Fleming and Daw, 2017) .
208
The notion of an observer computing additional criteria for counterfactual reasoning is 209 not new. For example, in the model of Type 1 conservatism of Maddox and Bohil (1998), 210 where observers trade off gain versus accuracy, k 1 is a weighted average of the optimal 211 criteria for maximizing expected gain (k opt ) and for exclusively maximizing accuracy (k p ). 212
In Zylberberg et al. (2018), observers learned prior probabilities of each stimulus type by an 213 updating decision-making mechanism that computes the confidence the observer would have 214 had if they had used the neutral criterion (k neu ) for their Type 1 judgment. We suggest that 215 for determining confidence in the face of asymmetric payoffs, optimal observers compute 216 the confidence they would have reported if they had instead used the k p criterion for the 217 discrimination judgment. In addition to the normative model we just described (i), we considered four sub-optimal 220 models (ii-v) for the counterfactual Type 1 criterion about which the Type 2 criteria are 221 symmetrically arranged:
All of these models are characterized by the placement of the counterfactual criterion, k * 1 ; 228 the distance δ is the only free parameter for all models. In the normative model (Ω 2,acc ), the 229 confidence criteria are systematically shifted so that they are centered on the discrimination 230 criterion that maximizes accuracy. We also consider a model in which confidence criteria 231 are centered on the criterion that maximizes gain (Ω 2,gain ), which is incorrect behavior in 232 the case of asymmetric payoffs. In the neutral model (Ω 2,neu ), confidence criteria remain 233 fixed around the neutral Type 1 criterion regardless of the prior or payoff manipulation. 234
Finally, for the models that shift in response to priors and payoffs, we consider that con-235 servatism in the discrimination criterion placement also affects k * 1 , either for the accuracy 236 model (Ω 2,acc+cons ) or the gain model (Ω 2,gain+cons ). In the latter model, k * 1 is identical to 237 k 1 . For the other models, some combinations of priors and payoffs will decouple k * 1 from k 1 . 238
For the Ω 2,acc+cons model, the decoupling only occurs for asymmetric payoffs. For the other 239 models, this decoupling occurs whenever priors or payoffs are asymmetric.
240
Our models assume that δ are placed symmetrically around k * 1 . However, the ability to 241 identify the underlying Type 2 model will not be affected by this assumption. Consider an 242 observer whose low-confidence region to the left of k * 1 was always greater than their low-243 confidence region to the right of k * 1 , such that k * 1 − k 2− > k 2+ − k * 1 . Then, the estimate of δ 244 would be similar because the experiment design tested the mirror prior-payoff condition (i.e., 245
for fixed k 2 , one condition would have k * 1 attracted to neutral and the other repelled, which is 246 not the behaviour of k * 1 in any Type 2 model). Thus, the best-fitting model would be unlikely 247
to change when δ is asymmetric, but it would fit less well. Alternatively, an asymmetry in 248 δ could be mirrored about the neutral criterion (e.g., the low confidence region closest to 249 the neutral criterion is always smaller). Then, the δ asymmetry would be indistinguishable 250 from a bias in the conservatism parameters. Ultimately, the confidence criteria are yoked to 251 k * 1 , and it is the patterns of criteria shift from all conditions jointly that are captured by the 252 model comparison. ture. The probability of a right-tilted Gabor could be 25, 50, or 75%. The points awarded 279 for correctly identifying a right-versus a left-tilt could be 4:2, 3:3, or 2:4. In the 3:3 pay-280 off scheme, a correct response was awarded 3 points. In the 2:4 and 4:2 schemes, correct 281 responses were awarded 2 or 4 points depending on the stimulus orientation. Incorrect re-282 sponses were not rewarded (0 points). The prior and payoff structure was explicitly conveyed 283 to the participant before the session began ( Fig. 2b) and after every 50 trials. Condition 284 order was randomized within condition type ( Fig. 2c ): no asymmetry (50%, 3:3), single 285 asymmetry (50%, 4:2; 50%, 2:4; 25%, 3:3; 75%, 3:3), or double asymmetry (25%, 4:2; 75%, 286 2:4). Note that two of the possible double asymmetry conditions (25%, 2:4; and 75%, 4:2) 287
were not tested because these conditions incentivized one response alternative to such a de-288 gree that they would not be informative for model comparison. Participants first completed 289 the full-symmetry condition, followed by the single-asymmetry conditions in random order, 290
and finally the double-asymmetry conditions, also in random order (Fig. 2d) . Each condition 291 was tested in a separate session with no more than one session per day. as warm-up and discarded from the analysis. All subjects were instructed to hone their 311 response strategy in the first 50 trials to encourage stable criterion placement. The trial 312 sequence is outlined in Fig. 2a . Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation dot for 313 200 ms. After a 300 ms inter-stimulus interval, a Gabor stimulus was displayed for 70 ms. 314
Participants judged the orientation (left/right) and then indicated their confidence in that 315 orientation judgment (high/low). Feedback on the orientation judgment was provided at the 316 end of the trial by both an auditory tone and the awarding of points based on the session's 317 payoff structure. Additionally, the running percentage of potential points earned was shown 318 on a leaderboard at the end of each session to foster inter-subject competition. Participants' 319 cash bonus was calculated by selecting one trial selected at random from each session and 320 awarding the winnings from that trial, with a conversion of 1 point to $ 
Results
334
We sought to understand how observers make perceptual decisions and confidence judg-335 ments in the face of asymmetric priors and payoffs. Participants performed an orientation-336 discrimination task followed by a confidence judgment. To account for the behavior, we 337 defined two sets of models, which were fit in a two-step process. Type 1 models defined the 338 contribution of conservatism to the discrimination responses. Type 2 models defined the role 339 of priors and payoffs in the confidence reports. Type 1 models were first fit using the discrimination responses alone. Four models were 342 compared: optimal criterion placement (Ω 1,opt ), equal conservatism for priors and payoffs 343
(Ω 1,1α ), different degrees of conservatism for priors and payoffs (Ω 1,2α ), and a model in which 344
there was a failure of summation of criterion shifts in the double-asymmetry condition (Ω 1,3α ). 345
Fitting the Type 1 models also provided an estimate of response bias, γ. We performed a 346
Bayesian model selection procedure using the SPM12 Toolbox (Wellcome Trust Centre for 347
Neuroimaging, London, UK) to calculate the protected exceedance probabilities (PEPs) 348
for each model (Figure 3a ). The exceedance probability (EP) is the probability that a 349 particular model is more frequent in the general population than any of the other tested 350 models. The PEP is a conservative measure of model frequency that takes into account the 351 overall ability to reject the null hypothesis that all models are equally likely in the population 352 of summation of criterion shifts (i.e., the best-fitting model was Ω 1,3α ).
355
In the second step, the Type 2 models were fit using each participant's best Type 1 model 356 and the associated maximum a posteriori (MAP) parameter estimates. The Type 2 models 357 differed in the placement of the Type 2 criteria, which split the internal response axis into 358 "high" and "low" confidence regions, for each "right" and "left" discrimination response. 359 We modeled the two Type 2 criteria as shifting to account for only the prior probability, 360 maximizing accuracy with the confidence response (Ω 2,acc ; the normative model), shifting 361 the confidence criteria in response to payoff manipulations (Ω 2,gain ; a sub-optimal model), or 362 failing to move the confidence criteria away from neutral at all (Ω 2,neu ; a sub-optimal model). 363 We also tested models where the conservatism found in the Type 1 decisions carried over into 364 the confidence decision (Ω 2,acc+cons and Ω 2,gain+cons ; both sub-optimal). We again compared 365 the models quantitatively with PEPs ( Figure 3b ). The favored model, Ω 2,gain+cons , shifts 366 the confidence criteria in response to both prior and payoff manipulations. Furthermore, 367
the conservatism that participants exhibited in the Type 1 decisions carried over into the 368 placement of the confidence criteria.
369 Figure 3c shows the best-fitting models for individual participants, according to the 370 amount of relative model evidence (here the marginal log-likelihood). Each of the Type 1 371 models except the optimal (Ω 1,opt ) was a best-fitting model for at least one of the ten partici-372 pants. Similarly, no one was best fit by the normative Type 2 model either (Ω 2,acc ). Overall, 373
there is no clear pattern between the pairings of Type 1 and Type 2 models. Figure S3 in the Supplement for condition order. The fill indicates the proportion of trials for that condition and stimulus that have that combination of response and confidence. Top row: Raw response rates of two example subjects. Subsequent rows, columns 1 and 3: Predicted response rates for each Type 2 model using the best-fitting parameters of the best-fitting Type 1 model for that individual. Columns 2 and 4: Difference between raw and predicted response rates. Green boxes: winning models (Subject 7: Ω gain+cons ; subject 9: Ω neu ). Figure 5 : Comparison of the empirical and predicted k 1 and k * 1 . Top row: empirical criteria of two example observers. The k * 1 was calculated as the midpoint between the two empirical k 2 (see Figure S1 for k 2 calculation details). Left column: predicted relationship between the Type 1 and Type 2 criteria (d = 1; either Ω 1,opt or Ω 1,1α with α = 0.5). Grey and square symbols: symmetry conditions. Triangles: prior asymmetry. Blue symbols: payoff asymmetry. Polar plots: residuals between empirical data and model prediction based on best-fitting parameters, plotted as vectors. Arrowheads: residuals greater than plot bounds.
Model Checks
We performed several checks on the fitted data to ensure that parameters were capturing 376 expected behavior and that the models could predict the data well (reported in detail in 377 Section 3 of the Supplementary Information) . The quality of a model is not only dependent 378 on how much more likely it is than others, but it is also dependent on its overall predictive 379 ability. To visualize each model's ability to predict the proportion of each response type 380 ("right" vs. "left" x "high" vs. "low"), we calculated the expected proportion of each 381 response type given the MAP parameters for each model and participant. We compared the 382 predicted response proportions to the empirical proportions (Figure 4 ). Larger residuals are 383 represented by more saturated colors. For the best-fitting models, the residuals are small 384 and unpatterned. 385 We also compared the Type 1 criteria and the counterfactual confidence criteria (Fig-386 ure 5). We constrained the empirical counterfactual confidence criterion to be the midpoint 387 between the two Type 2 criteria (i.e., k * 1 ≡ (k 2− + k 2+ )/2). Using k * 1 , the predictions made 388 by the Type 2 models are highly distinguishable. In the left-most column, predicted k 1 and 389 k * 1 for each session are shown for each model, assuming d = 1 and either Ω 1,opt or Ω 1,1α 390
where α = 0.5. In the top row, empirical criteria from the same two example participants 391 as in Figure 4 are shown. Empirical criteria are calculated with the standard SDT method 392 (detailed in Section 1 of the Supplementary Information, see Figure S1 ).
393
The visualization in the top row and left-most column of Figure 5 illustrates several 394 behavioral phenomena. The response bias, γ, results in a shift in all criteria in the same 395 direction, translating all data points parallel to the identity line. Conservatism is represented 396
by an attraction of all data toward the origin on the x-axis for Type 1 and the y-axis for 397
Type 2 judgments. The Type 2 models predict qualitatively different arrangements of the 398 data points. If the prior and payoff asymmetries affect the placement of the Type 1 criterion 399 but not the Type 2 criteria (Ω 2,neu ), the data are clustered along a single value on the y-axis. 400
If the prior and the payoff affect the placement of the Type 1 and Type 2 criteria equally, 401
(Ω 2,gain ), then the data fall on the identity line. With normative behavior (Ω 2,acc ), the prior 402 asymmetry conditions (grey triangles) fall on the identity line because confidence tracks the 403 prior, while in the payoff asymmetry conditions (blue squares), the data have the same k 2 404 midpoint as in the neutral condition (grey squares) because confidence does not track the 405 payoff.
406
Vectors in all 10 of the bottom right polar plots represent the difference (i.e., the residual) 407
between the empirical and the predicted criteria from the model fits. While the model 408 prediction column is based on fixed parameters, the predicted data used for the 10 polar 409 plots uses parameters that best fit the participant's data using that model. It is immediately 410
clear that the normative model (second row) does a poor job of describing participants' 411 behavior, and that conservatism is a necessary component of the models. We first measured the relative magnitude of conservatism due to priors and payoffs. Figure 6a 414 shows fitted α p and α v under the most complex conservatism model (Ω 1,3α ) and Figure 6b 415 shows them under the best-fitting model for each observer. In these figures, eight of the 416 ten participants were conservative in their criterion placement for both prior and payoff 417 manipulations, as indicated by data points in the gray regions. Of the eight participants 418 that displayed conservatism, five were significantly more conservative for payoff asymmetries 419 than prior asymmetries (α v < α p ), whereas only one was significant in the opposite direction 420 (α p < α v ). At the group level, however, we did not find a significant difference between the 421 best fitting α v and α p , either for the best-fitting Type 1 model or the winning model (paired 422 t-tests, p > 0.05). Note that the negative α values derive from a participant who shifted 423 criteria consistently in the opposite direction expected from a rational observer in response 424
to manipulations of payoffs and priors.
425
An additional implication of SDT is that an ideal observer's criterion shift due to pay-426
offs and due to priors should sum when both asymmetries are present as in Figure 1b : 427 (Stevenson et al., 1990) . Figure 6c shows the prediction of this additive rule. 428
Although the difference between the predicted and actual criterion shift is marginally signif-429 icant (t = 2.41, p = .039), this effect is driven by the four observers best fit by Ω 1,3α . Each of 430 these four observers had 95% CIs that did not overlap with the identity line. We show the 431 criterion placement in the double-asymmetry cases in Figure 6d . Most observers did not shift 432 their criterion far enough from neutral to the optimal placement, k opt . Three observers, how-433 a) Figure 6: Conservatism for Type 1 decision making. a) A comparison of the extent of conservatism under payoff versus prior asymmetries. Each data point represents the bestfitting conservatism parameters of a single observer when fit by Ω 1,3α . These parameters are only contingent on the conservatism in the single-asymmetry conditions. In this model, conservatism in the double-asymmetry conditions is captured by a separate model parameter. Darker marker fill: additional conservatism parameters were required to fit to that observer's data. Dashed line: equality line. Dark grey region: conservatism greater for prior than payoff manipulations (i.e., α p < α v ). Light grey region: conservatism is greater for payoffs (i.e., α p > α v ). Data points outside these regions are not consistent with conservative criterion placement. b) Same as (a) using fit parameters from the best-fitting Type 1 model for each observer. c) Test of summation of criterion shifts using the Ω 1,3α model fits. Observers who required a third α to capture their data (i.e., were best fit by Ω 1,3α ) had criterion shifts for the double-asymmetry conditions that were not well predicted as the sum of the shifts in the single-asymmetry conditions. d) Criterion placement in the double-asymmetry conditions. These are the same data as in the y-axis of (c), but extended to more easily compare the actual criterion placement with potential other task-relevant criteria. Horizontal criteria lines assume d =1.
ever, placed their criterion beyond k opt , with two stopping short of the accuracy-maximizing 434 criterion k p .
435
In summary, we find that conservatism for priors and conservatism for payoffs do not sum, 436
as traditional SDT predicts. Conservatism applied to priors and payoffs in the discrimination 437 decision was also incorporated into the confidence decision. Participants further deviated 438 from normative behavior by shifting their confidence criteria in response to asymmetric 439 payoffs, which do not inform the probability of a correct discrimination response. We conducted an orientation-discrimination task in which the prior probability of response 443 alternatives and the payoff matrix varied across sessions. Binary confidence reports were 444 collected after each discrimination judgment to gauge the observer's subjective appraisal of 445 the probability they were correct in their judgment. Observers were found to be conserva-446 tive in the placement of the discrimination criterion, k 1 , as revealed by the Type 1 model 447 comparison. Instead of placing the criterion at the optimal location, as determined by the 448 priors and payoffs, they had the tendency to place k 1 between the optimal criterion and the 449 neutral criterion. While we did find evidence of different degrees of conservatism for payoff 450 versus prior asymmetries at the individual-subject level, we found no evidence at the group 451 level that conservatism was stronger when the payoffs were asymmetrical than when the pri-452 ors were asymmetrical. Differences in conservatism were more apparent in previous studies 453 (Lee and Zentall, 1966; Ulehla, 1966; Healy and Kubovy, 1981; Maddox, 2002; Ackermann 454 and Landy, 2015), but not all (Healy and Kubovy, 1978) . Several factors may be contribut-455
ing to the observed conservatism of individual observers. Candidate explanations include 456 the hypothesis that observers trade off between maximizing gains and maximizing accuracy 457 (Maddox and Bohil, 1998) , as it may be hard for the observer to sacrifice accuracy for ex-458 pected gain. Alternatively, conservatism could depend on the criterion-adjustment strategy 459 (Busemeyer and Myung, 1992) , which may be differentially influenced by subjective factors 460 such as subjective probability and subjective utility (Ackermann and Landy, 2015) . This 461 explanation suggests that it is effortful to shift the criterion far from the neutral criterion 462
for an inconsequential gain. Another possibility is that it may be a combination of the two, 463
as suggested by Maddox and Bohil (2003) .
464
In additional analyses we explored the nature of conservatism further, both by fitting 465
Type 1 models with varying levels of complexity as well as testing the predictions of several 466 possible models for the case of both prior and payoff asymmetries. All participants were best 467 described by a model with some form of conservatism, with the majority best fit with two 468 or three separate conservatism parameters. In the extreme case, where three conservatism 469 parameters were needed, we find cases where additivity of criterion shifts was not obtained, 470
as predicted by Healy and Kubovy (1981) . By additivity we mean that the criterion shifts 471 induced by priors or payoffs sum when both are present. In our sample population, additivity 472
was not found for 40% of observers, which provides a similarly inconclusive follow-up to 473 previous attempts at testing additivity (Stevenson et al., 1990 ). Yet, the Bayesian Model 474
Selection procedure indicated that this was the winning model. Taking into account the 475 evidence for each model, as well as penalizing model complexity, we find that the most 476 complex Type 1 model does the best job of describing the behavior of our sample population. 477
Without any sizeable, systematic deviation from additivity (Figure 6c ), it is reasonable to 478 suggest this third conservatism parameter is capturing something else, relating to strategy 479 or noise, on the part of the observers.
480
How consistent is additivity with the various explanations of unequal conservatism for 481 priors and payoffs? In Sect. which acts as a scale factor on criterion shifts, is applied before or after the individual shifts 487 for priors and the payoffs are combined. If conservatism is applied to these components 488
individually, and then the resulting criteria are summed, this is equivalent to the Ω 1,1α or 489 Ω 1,2α models. If, however, the criterion is adjusted after both the priors or payoffs have been 490 applied, then the rate of change in reward based on the objective or subjective gain functions 491 is in no way constrained to match that of the single-asymmetry cases. Yet, we found that 492 the discrimination criterion in the double-asymmetry cases was placed beyond the optimal 493 criterion for 30% of observers, which is not consistent with a reluctance to shift the criterion 494 sufficiently from neutral. In fact, these criteria are biased in the direction of the accuracy-495 maximizing criterion, as would be expected under the gain-accuracy trade-off hypothesis. 496
However, we cannot distinguish the trade-off hypothesis from a liberal criterion placement 497 in the double-asymmetry case because, in our task, the prior odds ratio was always more 498 asymmetric than the rewards ratio, always placing the optimal criterion on the same side of 499 the neutral criterion as the accuracy-optimizing criterion. performance from experience with the task. If they happen to overestimate performance (i.e., 504 d > d ), then it follows from Eq. 5 that k 1 < k opt , and vice versa for underestimation. Note 505 that this is not a form of confidence in the response for a given trial, but a more general 506 metacognitive appraisal of the difficulty of the task. According to this hypothesis, most of the 507 observers would have been overestimating performance, with the one observer with liberal 508 criterion placement underestimating their performance. While it is not uncommon to find 509 overestimation of performance in the metacognitive literature (Mamassian, 2008 (Mamassian, , 2016 , this 510 explanation alone is insufficient as we find differences in the degree of conservatism for priors 511 versus payoffs for some participants. Thus, we conclude that the conservatism observed in 512 this task is likely due to a combination of possible factors, including noisy behavior, strategies 513 to trade off gain versus accuracy, sub-optimal criterion adjustment, and bias in participants' 514 judgments of their own d . We now turn to the Type 2 results, i.e., how observers form confidence judgments about 517 the discrimination decision. Five Type 2 models were characterized by the placement rule 518 for the counterfactual Type 1 criterion, k * 1 , around which the confidence criteria, k 2 , were 519 symmetrically placed. We tested whether this counterfactual criterion coincided with the 520 accuracy-maximizing criterion, the gain-maximizing criterion, either of these options with 521
the Type 1 conservatism applied, or whether it remained fixed at the neutral criterion. We 522 found no observer was best fit by the accuracy-maximizing optimal model (Ω 2,acc ), with 523 the majority split between the gain-maximizing-with-conservatism model (Ω find no clear pattern between the number of conservatism parameters required to explain 528 behavior and the placement strategy for confidence criteria.
529
We first turn our focus to the subset of observers who were best fit by the model in which 530 confidence criteria remained fixed around neutral (Ω 2,neu ). In this model, the perceived 531 magnitude of the tilt was all that was used to compute confidence. These observers correctly 532 did not allow the payoff structure of the environment to affect confidence, unlike the other 533 top-winning model. However, it is sub-optimal not to include the additional information 534 provided via the priors for the response alternatives but the lack of adaptability should not 535 be taken as evidence of an inability to adapt. It is possible that these observers ignored the 536 prior-payoff structure entirely for confidence, and instead opted for a criterion-placement 537 strategy that would work best for all conditions of the experiment. Future experiments 538 could incentivize accurate confidence judgments to test this hypothesis.
539
In the winning Type 2 model, observers placed k * 1 at the gain-maximizing Type 1 criterion 540 k p , with an adjustment for conservatism (Ω 2,gain+cons ). By adjusting the confidence criteria 541 so that the counterfactual Type 1 criterion tracks the actual Type 1 criterion, payoffs are 542 inappropriately incorporated into confidence judgments. As a consequence, higher relative 543 reward or cost will make a person more likely to select that alternative and, on average, more 544 confident about reporting that outcome when they do. In effect, this is a naïve optimism 545 for selecting the highly rewarded outcome and disproportionate pessimism for selecting the 546 costly outcome: "this highly rewarding perceptual alternative that I have selected is certainly 547 the state of the world" or "it is costly to me, so it cannot be true". This bias for higher 548 confidence with greater reward value (or smaller loss value) is consistent with what has been 549 reported previously in the perceptual lottery tasks of Lebreton et al. (2018) . Yet, we note 550 that a failure to understand the task instructions could have produced the bias we found. 551
It is possible that observers did not report the probability they were correct, as per the 552 experimenter instructions, but instead reported something about the expected gain of the 553 trial when reflecting on their confidence.
554
An inability to appropriately dissociate Type 1 and Type 2 responses, in both subsets of 555 observers, is compelling. If this is a true inability for sensory decision-making, then there is 556 a trade-off between maximizing gains for discrimination and accuracy for confidence. That 557 is, if observers cannot selectively decouple their k 1 and k * 1 for asymmetric payoffs, then 558 perhaps they reach a compromise by sacrificing some gains in the Type 1 task by shifting 559 k 1 toward the accuracy-maximizing criterion k p , thereby shifting k * 1 in a manner that yields 560 confidence reports more consistent with the objective probability of being correct. Consider, 561
for example, judging whether an aircraft is heading for collision with an upcoming mountain 562 peak. The high cost of collision should bias heading judgments toward predicting a collision, 563 so corrective actions can be taken. But you wouldn't want to be confident in that judgment 564 just because it results in high cost, so you reduce the bias and are a bit more confident 565 you'll pass by unscathed. The ideal trade-off between incorporating the payoff structure 566 versus accurately and confidently making a decision will of course depend on the decision at 567 hand. Subsequent laboratory experiments can attempt to shift this trade-off by using more 568 complex reward structures that incorporate both Type 1 and Type 2 judgments.
569
Finally, we turn to the result that the best-fitting Type 2 model had conservatism ap-570 plied to the counterfactual criterion k * 1 . It is currently a matter of debate whether the same 571 internal measurement of the sensory event is used by both the perceptual and the metacogni-572 tive decision-making systems (e.g., Resulaj et al., 2009; Fleming and Daw, 2017) . The SDT 573 framework used here assumes the same internal measurement is used for both judgments. 574
The Type 2 judgment is thought to include additional noise (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; 575 Fleming and Lau, 2014; Bang et al., 2018) , and as such, we incorporated reduced metacogni-576 tive sensitivity in our modeling. Additionally, our results suggest several possible scenarios 577 about how the decision boundaries during Type 1 and Type 2 decisions are related. The 578
Type 1 and Type 2 processes may be computed jointly using the same information, but there 579 is considerable evidence that neural processing occurs in distinct regions for perceptual and 580 metacognitive decision-making (Shimamura, 2000; Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Rahnev et al., 581 2016; Shekhar and Rahnev, 2018) . The Type 1 system may convey information to the Type 2 582 system about its decision boundary, or convey only relative information. Additionally, the 583 processes responsible for conservatism are also applied to the counterfactual criterion in the 584
Type 2 system. Given the complexity of the conservatism we observed, it would appear un-585 likely for the Type 2 system to recreate the phenomenon of conservatism with information 586 acquired independently from the Type 1 system. Thus, we favor the interpretation that the 587 exact effects of priors and payoffs in perceptual decision-making are also propagated to the 588 metacognitive system. Given that a subset of observers were able to dissociate k 1 and k * 1 589 by keeping the latter fixed at the neutral criterion, it is less likely that the Type 2 system 590 receives an internal measurement that is coded relative to the discrimination criterion k 1 . 591
Yet, if this is the case, why weren't observers able to reduce the influence of the payoff struc-592 ture at the second processing step? Further work is required to understand why optimal 593 metacognitive behavior was not achieved. 594
Conclusion
595
By manipulating priors and payoffs in a perceptual task, we found sub-optimal decision 596 making at the Type 1 and Type 2 levels. Discrimination judgments were conservative, 597 with no strong tendency for greater conservatism for payoffs than priors. There was also 598 evidence against additivity of criterion shifts for asymmetric priors and payoffs. Confidence 599 judgments were sub-optimal in one of two ways: 1) observers did not consider the role of 600 priors or 2) they incorporated payoffs. Both of these strategies hinder decision-making. 601
For example, a radiologist who ignores prior probabilities when assigning confidence might 602 hesitate recommending further tests for a patient who is a heavy smoker. Similarly, a 603 radiologist who inappropriately incorporates payoffs may be more confident in a positive 604 diagnosis if he receives kickbacks from the imaging center to encourage future scans. The 605 patterns of behavior found in this task point to explanations of why humans may consider 606 trade-offs between maximizing gain and maximizing accuracy, as well as provide new insights 607 about the role of the decision boundary in Type 1 versus Type 2 computations. 
